Compatibilism & Omni-Causation
Consider the following: If A causes A, and B causes B, then A could act in “compatibility” with B simply by knowing what B will do in any given situation. (Such knowledge of contingencies is denoted as Middle Knowledge.) But if A causes both A & B, then there is no basis to say that A is acting in compatibility with B, and that’s why compatibilism fails. As an example from Genesis 50:20, God does what He wants to do, and Joseph’s brothers do what they want to do. But if God causes both what He wants to do & every single thought of Joseph’s brothers, then God is no longer acting compatibilistically. However, if God uses the thoughts and intentions of another, then it can be rightly said that He acts compatibilistically with their will. But if God causes their thoughts, so that they think and desire only precisely what He wants for them to think and to want, then that vacates any basis for acting compatibilistically, and leaves room only for raw Determinism. Only Arminianism can establish a basis for God to act compatibilistically with man.
Calvinist, James White: “The longest, clearest presentation of compatibilism is found in God’s use of Assyria as an instrument of judgment on the rebellious people of Israel: ‘“Woe to Assyria, the rod of My anger And the staff in whose hands is My indignation, I send it against a godless nation And commission it against the people of My fury To capture booty and to seize plunder, And to trample them down like mud in the streets. Yet it does not so intend, Nor does it plan so in its heart, But rather it is its purpose to destroy And to cut off many nations.”...So it will be that when the Lord has completed all His work on Mount Zion and on Jerusalem, He will say, “I will punish the fruit of the arrogant heart of the king of Assyria and the pomp of his haughtiness.”’ (Isaiah 10:5-7, 12) In one passage we have God’s holy intention of judging His people through the means of Assyria—yet God holds Assyria accountable for her sinful attitudes in being so used! God judges them on the basis of their intentions, and since they come against Israel with a haughty attitude that does not recognize God’s power and authority, they too are judged. This is compatibilism with clarity: God uses the sinful actions of the Assyrians for the good purpose of judging His people, and yet He judges the Assyrians for their sinful intentions. God’s action in His sovereignty is perfectly compatible with the responsible, and culpable, actions of sinful men.” (Debating Calvinism, pp.43-44, emphasis mine)
Question: But how is “perfectly compatible” if A causes B? In other words, if God [A] caused the “intentions” and “haughty attitude” of the Assyrians [B], then how can you say that God “uses” what He causes?
Answer: The only way for God to be acting compatibilistically is if God “uses” what someone else has determined for themselves. If God could somehow know what someone wants, and will do, in any given situation, then it can be rightly said that He “uses” their intentions in order to bring about a good outcome. Calvinism has no logical basis to assert any form of compatibilism, but only raw Determinism.
Question: According to Calvinism, God is sovereign over all things, and has decreed whatsoever comes to pass, with the result that omni-causality gives rise to omniscience. So do Calvinists believe that God is sovereign over thought in the same way that God is sovereign over action, given how Calvinism defines “sovereignty”?
Answer: Calvinists emphatically answer, “Yes!” But Calvinists are inconsistent with this. Calvinists insist that God decrees whatsoever comes to pass, and that had He not done so, He could not otherwise know it, but then insist that God does not necessarily cause people to want to sin, because it is “already there.” But, is it “already there” without God’s decree of whatsoever comes pass? Here is where Calvinists waffle in their thinking. As the logic goes, God doesn’t cause their thinking, but does cause their actions, so that they determine for themselves, what God determined for them to do, and therefore it all fits within the scope of God’s decree. Calvinists bamboozle others because they have first bamboozled themselves.
James White: “Despite the constant misrepresentation of the opponents of God’s sovereignty, to fully appreciate the biblical evidence is to recognize that God’s decree does not make Him the author of sin.” (Debating Calvinism, p.42, emphasis mine)
That would be true if A does not cause B in its entirety.
Now sometimes God will harden a person, with the result that they will commit sin, but the difference is that what this does is takes someone’s own self-determined, undecreed intentions, and strengthens their resolve, and makes them more resolute in their intentions. This has the effect of saying, “Ok, if this is really how you want to be, this is where I will arrange to have it take you.” When the hardening is over (as Romans 11:25 indicates that Israel underwent a partial hardening” until the times of the Gentiles are fulfilled), a person can then revisit their heart, and by introspection, see where it had taken them, in order that by reflection, a person may reconsider their ways and disposition towards God.
There is another issue. As shown, sometimes Calvinists will insist that whereas God decrees whatsoever comes to pass, He doesn’t necessarily cause what people think, because that is already there. Even though that is a contradiction in and of itself, the other issue is that according to Calvinism, God has a purpose in what He decrees, and having decreed whatsoever comes to pass, God has a purpose in everything that ends up happening.
James White: “If God’s decree does not include the evil of mankind, that evil has no purpose, and Hunt is left directing us to a God who creates the possibility of evil, starts this universe off on its course, and then tries His best to ‘fix things’ as they fall apart in a torrent of wickedness. This is supposed to comfort us? This is the God who says that He works all things after the counsel of His will? Hardly!” (Debating Calvinism, pp.319-320, emphasis mine)
James White: “It’s far better to have a God, who in creating this universe, does not create with a sovereign decree, that determines actions in time. …God created all that evil, and has no purpose for it, none whatsoever. At least the Reformed person can say that God uses means, we can look at the Compatibilism that’s plainly presented in Genesis chapter 50, Isaiah 10, Acts 4, we can talk about the purity of God’s motivations and the impurity of man’s motivations, ect.” (Theology Matters: The Parable of the Farmer--Geisler)
Here’s the problem: If sin has a “purpose,” then it will be shown that Compatibilism fails.
Question: If God has a “purpose” in a depraved person committing sin “A,” then doesn’t it stand to reason, that God doesn’t have a purpose in them committing sin’s “B” through “Z”?
Answer: Yes, and that’s the beginning of the end of Compatibilism.
In other words, if it’s God’s purpose for the depraved person to commit sin “A,” then the depraved person’s freedom of choice to commit sin’s “B” through “Z,” is therefore a threat to the purpose-driven will of God. The purpose-driven decree of God, must therefore restrict all of the depraved person’s range of sinful choices down to only one sinful choice, which perfectly aligns with the decreed will, amongst a multitude of other sinful alternatives and options.
Question: How would God reduce a depraved person’s range of sinful choices down to only that one single sinful choice which God has allegedly purposed for them to commit?
Answer: God would have to remove any semblance of free will (thereby eliminating Compatibilism), and instill a desire which matches His one sole purpose.
Ultimately, Omni-Causality leaves no room for Compatibilism.
Compatibilism:
Calvinist, James White: “The biblical relationship of God’s sovereign decree to the creaturely will of man has been aptly called ‘compatibilism,’ the belief that these two things are not contradictory but compatible with one another, when viewed properly.” (Debating Calvinism, p.43, emphasis mine)
